This research argues that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 produced dramatic changes in the racial, political, and legal contexts o f the South. By guaranteeing the franchise to 3.5 million eligible black voters the V R A contributed to a change in the racial and political equilibrium o f the 505 counties covered by the V R A Within these counties, many Southern white voters responded to the mobilization of black voters by casting votes for Republican candidates in congressional elections. The change in white partisan voting patterns appears to be inversely related to socioeconom ic status.
Introduction
Theories o f context assert system level processes. Individuals respond to many aspects o f their political environm ent which they have little control over. Any failure to recognize this simple fact is not only a failure to understand an im portant part of our social reality, but also almost necessarily results in a failure to make effective policy. This paper examines whites and blacks as political actors influenced by the political environm ent of the South, which means that the politics of race and the racial context play an im portant role in determ ining politi cal behaviors.
Like Key (1949) , we believe that race and the racial-political equilibrium of the South are im portant factors structuring the politics of the region. The racial equilibrium that existed prior to the Voting Rights Act produced one style of southern politics-the largely white politics of a single-party system. The Voting Rights Act did much m ore than extend guarantees o f political participation to blacks. It directly influenced the behaviors of blacks and in the process changed the political context that had shaped the dominant political mode o f the region since reconstruction.
Less easily anticipated, however, were the reactions o f whites. Long accustomed to the exclusion of blacks from politics, white voters were affected immensely by passage of the VRA, as well. However, it was not strictly the V R A that affected whites; it was the activities of blacks. Suddenly, whites were moved to an entirely new political context. Thus, the Voting Rights Act had both anticipated and unfore seen consequences. The passage of the V R A had the desired-and expected-effect of mobilizing blacks by guaranteeing them the fran chise. To do this, the V R A mandated institutional change in the South, removing and revising many of the formal barriers that had been erected to black political participation. By removing the barriers to participation, the V R A set up new institutions and changed or modified old ones. W ith the easing of legal restrictions and with federal protec tions against intimidation, blacks found that they could more fully participate in the politics of the nation and the region.
Since the V R A changed only the institutional framework of southern elections, little of the V R A directly affected whites. Aside from forbidding whites to attem pt to prevent blacks from registering or voting, there was little in the V R A to affect whites or provoke a change in white political behaviors.1 N onetheless, white behaviors did change after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. T he reason for this, however, was not the V R A per se. Congress had enacted legislation to protect southern blacks many times since 1957-as it had also done in the post Civil War C ongresses-w ithout a wholesale effect on white behaviors in the re gion. Such previous attem pts to legislate equal protection had failed to have an impact on white behaviors because they failed to have an impact on black behaviors. Political institutions w ere little changed; whites continued to enjoy political monopoly; their political behaviors and loyalties never faltered; and their "extra-institutional" tactics of vote denial continued.
The 1965 Act differed in that it enabled millions of blacks to share in the political processes of the South, which facilitated change in the political and racial equilibria of the region. Many whites, in efforts to stave off such changes, responded to this black mobilization by changing their own longstanding political behaviors. Thus, it was the changed racial, political, and legal context that the V R A produced that was the proximal cause of the change in white behaviors.
For whites and blacks alike, the change was sudden and quite dramatic. In a very short time the legal and social institutions of the South, and the political context of which they were part, were upset and even destroyed. Indeed, the changes brought about were so great that they could be compared to a change in political systems. Although the players remained the same, the game had changed. The racial balances in the electorate were altered, and, in this new political environment, new political strategies became necessary for each race. Blacks had the problems and opportunities of a guaranteed vote, and southern whites faced com petition for political power for the first time in 90 years. From this perspective, the reactions of blacks and whites to the V R A become more completely understandable, as both are involved in the politics o f contextual change in the South as brought about by the VRA.
Methodology and Data
This research examines mobilization and partisan reactions of white and black voters in counties of the 'D eep South' The D eep South includes those 505 counties which violated the statistical "trig ger" o f the Voting Rights Act o f 1965 but did not receive federal voting examiners.2 W e use county-level, general election results for Con gress. These election results are available for total turnout as well as by party. Congressional elections offer interesting advantages in the study of white reaction to increased black voting. First, because Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it is likely that any reaction vented against the legislation would occur in the congressional elec tions. Second, prior to the Voting Rights Act, the southern congres sional delegation was nearly solidly Democratic. If black voting rights triggered a partisan reaction among whites, then it should be com para tively easy to identify those new trends in the one-party dom inant con gressional elections.
We estim ate black and white participation patterns for con gressional elections from 1950 through 1980. T hen we examine turn out and partisan voting patterns, by race, for this period. T he 30 year time period permits an investigation of established trends prior to 1965, that is, prior to the shattering of the old racial equilibrium. This time frame also permits the observation of changes in participation patterns that occurred in the context of the new racial equilibrium.
We use ecological regression to obtain average probabilities that whites and blacks vote in each unique election.4 These estimates may also be obtained for partisan turnout, by race. Finally, it is impor tant to note that several estimation techniques were tested to d eter mine the most valid and reliable results. T he estim ates obtained are very robust; each estimation technique produced extraordinarily similar results. For a more detailed explanation of our estim ation techniques, please refer to the "Technical N ote" below.
The Pre-Voting Rights Act Equilibrium
Over thirty years ago V.O. Key argued that the politics of the South are explained by one critical factor: race. He maintained that the predom inant consideration in the creation and continuation of south ern political institutions had been 1) to assure the continued subordina tion of blacks at the local levels, and 2) to block any threats by outsiders (i.e., N ortherners) to the southern style of politics and political ar rangements. It is when the equilibrium in race relations is threatened that "the issue of the negro" comes to the fore in political discussion (Key 1949, 665-68) .
Following the Civil War, white southerners began to fashion formal and informal institutions and mechanisms to exclude blacks from political participation and influence. Violence, trickery, intimida tion, and various illegal and extra-legal means w ere frequently em ployed to keep blacks from the polls on election day (Lawson 1976, 6-8) . But southern whites preferred legal and institutional means of perpetuating black disenfranchisement. Hence, restrictive and selec tively enforced voter registration requirem ents w ere designed to pre clude meaningful black participation.
Southern whites had reason to fear the black ballot in several states, and felt threatened by it in ways that today are often forgotten. The southern black population contained about five million eligible voters, yet approximately 75% of eligible blacks were not registered in 1955 (Lawson 1976, 129 ) -a time during which many of those who w ere registered still preferred the party of Lincoln, while others were not as yet firmly attached to the New Deal coalition (which, after all, was an abrupt turnabout from its antecedents). It was feared that the dom inance o f the D em ocratic party in the South might be threatened, and/or that blacks might hold the balance o f power in southern politics, if they w ere guaranteed the right to vote (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1959, 31). T he potential political and electoral pow er o f blacks in areas o f the South was substantial enough to alter existing legal and social arrangem ents; should blacks mobilize, the changes in local and regional political and social structures could be enorm ous. Accord ingly, the strongest efforts by southern whites to disenfranchise blacks occurred in areas where blacks constituted a substantial portion o f the population, and in which whites feared not so much a loss o f their own control over the Democratic party as the rise to power of a blackdominated G O P (Key 1949, 540) . Southern white behavior, in short, was proportional to the size of the local black population.
The political system of the South prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 might be viewed as a system in equilibrium. T he equilibrium was one of white dominance in southern political and social life; a balance kept in place by legal and institutional discrimination and the selective application o f various protections, privileges, and different (or differentially applied) criteria for access to the instrum ents o f political or social influence.
It is im portant to note, however, that the behaviors of southern whites were highly dependent upon the behaviors of southern blacks. The equilibrium was stable because blacks were effectively excluded from influence. However, should the black population take a voice proportional to their numbers, the equilibrium would be altered and the white populace would be forced to find a new response to the racial context. T he key to the political behavior of the southern whites is found in the continuity of the mechanisms of black exclusion from politics. W hen those mechanisms ceased to keep blacks disenfran chised, the white strategy disappeared as well, and the political behav ior of whites began to hinge directly on the political behavior of the blacks.
Contextual Change
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was the most far reaching and effective statute o f its kind. Among its provisions were a m ethod for the automatic determ ination of w hether discriminatory voting laws existed in jurisdictions; the suspension of local voting laws; pre-clearance by the Justice D epartm ent of new voting laws; and on-site federal voting registrars under certain circumstances. Because it had "te e th " that effectively negated the institutional mechanisms for black disfranchise ment, the passage of the Voting Rights Act altered the equilibrium between the white and black populations. The removal o f the institu tional barriers opened paths to political participation for southern blacks that heretofore had been virtually insurmountable. Blacks re sponded by registering and voting in increasing numbers. Many whites, finding their institutional safeguards disabled, reacted by changing their behaviors in order to hold onto their political power.
Prior to the Voting Rights Act, southern whites did not always find participation in politics essential. Turnout in general elections was comparatively low because there was little meaningful party com peti tion. The South was a one-party Democratic region, with many D em o cratic congressional nominees finding themselves unopposed in the general elections. Very few blacks enjoyed the vote. Those that did probably exercised their vote in a non-threatening manner; with little choice on the ballot, the few blacks that voted did little more than affirm the candidates already chosen.
This white-dominated electoral situation changed in two ways after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. First, the southern black population began voting in large numbers. A potential pool of 3.5 million black voters began to enjoy the franchise and exercise their political power. Second, the black population rewarded the Demo cratic Party with their support. Partially because the Democratic Party was primarily responsible for the passage of the VRA, and partially in response to Dem ocratic platforms and programs o f the New Deal, blacks began to assume Democratic allegiance in great numbers. Con trary to the fears of many Democrats, the V R A did not emancipate an opposition force, but helped swell the ranks of the Democratic Party in the South as never before. W hite southern Democrats, rather than finding a potent black Republican Party forming in the region, found blacks mobilizing largely within their own party. Not only was the bal ance o f political power in the region shifting, but the balance of power within "the party" had also shifted; whites found that they had to respond to a trem endous change in the political system of the region. Accordingly, it is im portant to examine white reactions to the newly guaranteed black vote.
T he civil rights initiatives o f the 1960's, especially the Voting Rights A ct o f 1965, significantly altered the political behavior of blacks, who began voting in substantial numbers during this period. White turnout also began to increase following the V R A largely in reaction to the newly mobilized black electorate. Two factors are probably primar ily responsible for the mobilization of whites. First, the VRA extended the vote to some whites who previously might have been excluded. The institutional and extra-legal mechanisms used to keep southern blacks from becoming powerful also excluded some whites (whose participa tion may have been considered undesirable), although the relative num bers o f these were comparatively small. Second, the V RA and the subsequent black mobilization it perm itted "shocked" a portion of the white electorate, mobilizing some white voters who did not participate in the 1950's and early 1960's.
Average turnout patterns do not completely reveal the change in the racial context from the previously existing equilibrium between whites and blacks. The eligible black population began participating in large numbers, and rewarded the Democratic Party for bringing about the V R A by voting for its candidates. As a consequence, some whites, traditionally the mainstay of the Democratic party in the South, began to move away from the more racially aware and increasingly racially mixed Dem ocratic party and toward the more hom ogeneous R epubli can party (see Figure 1 ). 
YEAR
To a large extent, these changes set the process moving toward the new racial and political equilibrium we see today in the South. This is an interesting and dramatic reaction by a portion of the southern white population. The politics of the South had long been dom inated by a mostly white Democratic Party. A fter blacks began to support the Democratic party in overwhelming numbers, many whites apparently considered the Republican alternative. Consequently, one of the o u t comes of the new racial equilibrium was that it contributed to a partisan realignment of the South.
The Effects of Education
It is im portant to examine w hether white reaction to black voting is conditioned by the form er's education levels and socioeco nomic status. Socioeconomic characteristics, especially education, are im portant predictors of voting behavior (C am pbell, et al. 1960; Wolfinger and R osenstone 1980) . The literature is replete with evidence that education is a strong positive influence on turnout. In any cross section o f the public we find that voters at higher income levels vote more than those at lower income levels, and that people with more education are m ore likely to vote than those with less education. Similarly, studies of aggregate data regularly dem onstrate that increasing turnout levels correspond with increasing mean education in almost any aggregate.
W e expect that the probability of participation is directly and positively correlated with mean education levels of southern whites, just as it is elsewhere. M ore im portant than this simple relationship, however, is the differential reaction to black political mobilization and participation by whites at different educational levels. Despite the higher turnout rates of highly educated whites, we expect that the partisan reaction to black voting will be found most extensively among whites at lower education strata. Poorly educated whites indeed do defect from the D em ocratic Party to the Republican at a rate higher than that o f b etter educated whites in the South.
The stronger reaction by the poorly educated white population might be explained by their greater sensitivity to the racial and social changes that the V R A initiated. The V R A wrought tremendous po tential political pow er and was contem poraneous with great increases in black social and economic mobility. Such changes brought blacks and poor whites (often poorly educated, as well) into direct competi tion in num erous ways; the new political and social power of blacks was a greater challenge to the status o f lower class whites than to the white upper crust o f southern society. Thus, we present data on white partisan mobilization patterns, by race and education, for counties in the D eep South.5 Off-year congressional (general) elections are used in order to control "coattail effects" that might distort partisan voting patterns in data from presidential elections.
Prior to the expansion of black political participation precipi tated by the passage o f the VRA, white support for the Democratic Party appears to have been related to education: support for Demo cratic candidates is lowest in those counties which have the highest average white education levels, and higher in counties w here the whites are less well educated (see Figure 2) .
In 1966, the first set of elections following the V R A white sup- port for the Dem ocraticParty among all education (and income) levels peaks and goes into a decline. Significantly, the greatest decline in white support for the Dem ocrats is found in the counties w here white education is lowest. Poorly educated whites began to leave the D em o cratic Party at about the same time that blacks w ere mobilizing into it. Only two possible strategies were open to the whites troubled by the fact that blacks were now entering "their" party: demobilization or conversion to another party. Each of these possibilities may be tested by examining the change in support for Republican congressional can didates in the various counties, since demobilization should be evinced by a decrease in the num ber voting Democratic without a com m ensu rate increase in the num ber of those voting Republican. As shown in Figure 3 , white voters in all educational categories became increasingly likely to support Republican congressional candi dates starting in 1962, with the greatest increase occurring in the 1966 off-year elections. Further, the rate of white defection to Republican candidates is inversely correlated with white education levels: the R e publicans gain the greatest increases in those counties where the means for white education were the lowest; Republican voting shows slower growth in counties in which whites were better educated, and white support for Republicans was already well established.
In general, the same patterns are found in the relationship b e tween income and the partisan vote split. The basic observation is one o f a political "white flight'' to the Republicans, with that tendency ap pearing where whites have low average income and education levelsand, not so coincidentally, where black populations are large. 
YEAR
G eneralizing from national as well as comparative findings, we ex pect that voters who possess comparatively high levels of education, income, and occupational status will participate in the greatest numbers and at the greatest frequencies over time. Low status individuals, in contrast, are often depicted as politically disaffected and alienated-and not prone to political activity o f any sort. Almost universally we expect there to be a dramatic decline in participation rates as education, income, and social status decrease.
Y et southern whites in counties covered by the V RA proved different. The low status whites in these counties evinced a "white flight" m obilization-a pattern of reaction in which the environment induces large numbers o f people to change their behaviors at the same time. Not only low status southern white voters began to support R e publicans, but even those who were non-voters prior to the VRA began to turn out for elections thereafter. And it is im portant to note that, as in any realignment, the party into which such non-participants mobi lized was not the party they should be expected to affiliate with. Low status southern whites began to support Republican congressional candidates in fairly large numbers after the VRA; an unusually large number appeared to convert from long-time Dem ocratic affiliations; and, in accord with a traditional realignment, many others were newly mobilized whites for whom voting for Republican candidates was their first participation in politics.
N ote too that at the same time southern whites w ere fleeing to the Republican Party, southern blacks began to participate in D em o cratic politics in large numbers. Such an affiliation, as noted earlier, was likewise somewhat unexpected. Although the Dem ocrats were primar ily responsible for the passage of federal civil rights legislation, as well as for New D eal era platforms sympathetic to the plight o f the poor, it remains that the traditional party of those southern blacks who already held the franchise was the Republican Party. However, since so few blacks in the South had participated previously in politics, the attach ment of blacks in the aggregate to the Republican Party was considera bly w eaker than that of southern whites to the Democrats. While change o f affiliation patterns occurred among citizens of both races, the change was most dramatic among whites. Among blacks, change was more a m atter of mobilization of new voters into the ranks o f the Democractic electorate than of party-switching by the franchised.
The new attraction that the Republican party held for southern whites, and for lower class, poorly educated whites in particular, may not have been due either to the Republicans' resistance to civil rights, or to the D em ocrats' support of civil rights. O ther factors, especially social ones, seem to be more significant. For many years prior to the 1965 V R A the Democratic Party (excluding the southern delegation) had been sympathetic to civil rights programs. However, throughout the period before the '65 Act, whites in the South had remained steadfast Democrats, especially at the local level, in spite of their apparent differences with the national party over race issues. The defections to Republican candidates by whites do not begin until blacks increase their involvement within the Dem ocratic Party. Hence, we think it fair to characterize the white reaction as one of "white fear'' or "white flight,'' fueled by the change in the politics of the South, rather than by any change in the policy positions of the two parties. The Southern Republican Party had been available for some time; whites simply did not choose to support it until blacks began to move into the Dem ocratic Party. Thus, while it was the V R A that opened political participation to blacks in the South, it was the shift in the political and social context produced by a politically active black population that changed the behaviors of whites.
These general conclusions are buttressed by an examination of voting patterns of southern whites living in counties that were not covered by the 1965 Voting Rights Act. It is im portant and relevant to note that the average black population in these unaffected counties is 15% com pared with nearly 30% in the V RA -covered jurisdictions of the D eep South. In these non-covered counties the general trend was for whites to rem ain loyal to the Dem ocratic party, for Democratic electoral successes to continue further into the decade of the 1970's, and for R epublican mobilization of whites to arrive later and with less overall success.
Figures 4 and 5 trace the Dem ocratic and Republican voting of whites of various education levels in counties unaffected by the Voting Rights Act. Comparison of these figures with the earlier figures for the VRA -covered counties shows, primarily, that the trend of defection to Republican candidates is significantly delayed for most education groups. Dem ocratic party support among both high and low education whites in the non-covered counties continued to increase until the 1974 elections, for example, and its support from the middle education group continued to increase until the election of 1978. 
The ability of the Republican party to attract white voters in the south increased across the entire thirty year period included in this study. In both VRA-covered and non-covered counties, whites increas ingly were attracted to the Republican party from 1950 on. However, the growth in attraction to the party, while always positive, does not accelerate as dramatically after 1965 in the counties that were unaf fected by the VRA. In fact, with the exception of highly educated whites, there is a slight indication that the growth of the Republican party actually slows in the non-covered counties after the VRA. The differences between Republican voting in 1962 and in 1966, respec tively, were not statistically significant in the counties that were not covered by the VRA, whereas much larger and statistically significant (at alpha <0.05) increases occurred in the covered counties. Although not a conclusive test, this difference in means suggests that there may be a different dynamic in the two types of settings. It does not mean that race was not an issue in the non-covered counties; it does mean that there was a less dramatic change in white voting patterns subse quent to the passage of the VRA.
Conclusions
This paper has suggested that the voting rights legislation of the 1960's, especially the Voting Rights Act of 1965, precipitated substan tial changes in southern political life. It has shown that when the VRA disturbed the racial balance of southern politics by mobilizing blacks m ore effectively than before, whites responded to that new political context by mobilizing and by considering the Republican alternative in num bers not seen since the Civil War. W hat is quite im portant is that, unlike blacks, whites did not appear to respond to the legislation itself, but rath er to the change that the legislation induced in the social setting. Because this legislation worked as none had in the past, in that blacks began to vote and to participate in the heretofore white-domi nated political system, whites found a "need" to respond politically, as well. W hen some whites saw that they would have to share their historic party o f affiliation with blacks, they began to consider changing affiliations. A nd when other whites who had seen no need to vote perceived that blacks might gain a political voice competitive with or superior to their own, they beat a path to the voting registrar.
In much the same way that the racial integration of many urban neighborhoods initiated white flight to suburbia, the racial integration o f the D em ocratic party and electoral politics in the South initiated a white flight to Republicans. In each c a se -th e opening of neighbor hoods and the opening of the ballot b o x -th e enactm ent of effective legislation elim inated barriers to blacks and thus perm itted new behav iors (selection of neighborhood and voting). In neither case did the legislation itself alter the behaviors o f whites; rather, whites responded to the changed environment.
F u rther evidence that whites responded to the changed politi cal context and not to the Act itself is found in the variation of white behaviors according to the social and economic status of the county of residence, and in the much less dramatic changes that occurred in the areas unaffected by the V R A If such change owed simply to the Act itself, then white behaviors should be invariant over various social settings. If, on the other hand, political and social context matter, then there should be some variation in the intensities of change in white behaviors across social environments. And indeed, this is what was found.
Substantial variation in white political behavior was found as the educational (and financial) status of their environm ent changed.
Whites resident in socioeconomically advantaged counties showed markedly less change in their political behaviors over time than did those residing among the less educated and poorer parts of southern society. O f course, black densities were also greater in those same areas of the South where income and education were lowest. Further, in those areas which were not covered by the VRA, we find less reaction by whites after the passage of the VRA. Such counties were not covered for several reasons. T here may have been too few blacks (or minorities) in the county to warrant coverage, or they may have been already participating at "acceptable" rates. In either event, whites in those counties encountered no great change in the behaviors of blacks.
That white reactions were most intense in covered counties where white education and income were lowest is unsurprising. First, whites living in the lower status environments were much more likely to have regular direct contact with the very blacks mobilized by the VRA. Second, studies o f political tolerance indicate that many forms of toler ance, including specifically racial tolerance, are greater among the more elite segments of society. The better educated are the most supportive of integration, free speech, and other civil liberties in prin ciple.
Living in a high status environm ent thus may act in several different ways to reduce the white fear reaction to blacks exercising voting rights. Psychologically, education and income insulate people from the lower classes of society by erecting social barriers and feelings of separation, and hence the "separateness" may reduce perceptions of threat. In addition, education in particular is known to increase social and political tolerance. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, high income and education areas are likely to contain the fewest blacks; not only are there social and psychological differences due to status, but there are real economic barriers that act to perpetuate residential segregation patterns that will further keep the classes apart.
TECHNICAL NOTE
Analyses and data such as those which underlay this research often prompt concerns related to ecological regression and the technical requirements o f regression estimation m ethods, especially problems o f heteroskedasticity.
Analyses o f aggregate data almost uniformly elicit concerns about the "eco logical fallacy," the notion that any assertion that individual level behaviors follow patterns identified in the aggregate may be an incorrect inference. In general, the validity o f any inference to aggregates smaller than that used in the analysis is not assured. However, one may legitimately use the analyses to deduce properties at the same level o f aggregation (or greater). Thus, just as one may deduce county-level properties from individual level data, one may also make state level expectations from county data. But the reverse is not necessarily valid. The research presented in this paper uses county level data to make only county level inferences.
A related but more pressing concern revolves around the fact that measures such as county m eans and proportions will mask both considerable variance in individual behaviors and county characteristics. A county where every resident has just 12 years of education has the sam e m ean as a county in which educations are uniformly distributed across an interval o f 9 to 15 years, even though the two counties obviously are very different.
In addition, all counties weigh equally in any regression where the county is the unit o f analysis. How ever, different counties will have different population sizes and should som etim es not be considered equals. Just as com puting a grand mean will som etim es require that differentials am ong com ponents be accounted for, so, too, regression analyses will som etim es require the various units to contribute differentially to the regression estim ates.
What on e should do in these various circumstances will depend upon the substantive uses to which the analyses are to be put. The southern counties can be grouped together into cross-sections, by election year. From this sample o f counties we can obtain the average probabilities (pj and p2) that blacks and whites participate in each election under study. These probabilities can then be plotted across time to observe variations in black and white patterns o f participa tion generally, as well as under certain specific conditions. 5In order to measure the effect o f education on mobilization we estimate equation 3 for the D eep South counties sorted into 'high,' 'm edium ,' and 'low' white education categories for each election year. W e create the education categories by finding the m edian white educational level for the D eep South counties for each election year and adding one standard deviation above and below the average. Thus, the 'low' education category includes those counties ranging from the minimum to one standard deviation below the median. The 'm edium ' education category includes those counties falling within one standard deviation below and above the median. Likewise, the 'high' education category includes those counties which range from one standard deviation above the m edian to the maximum.
T w o caveats must be m entioned. First, it is necessary that there are a suffi cient num ber o f counties in each category for each election year. This condition is met; N d oes not fall below 64 for any category in any election year. Second, the model cannot perform well if the variation in the independent variable (percent black county popula tion) is lost. For instance, if the high white education counties have very small black populations, then there is insufficient variation in the independent variable to obtain the probabilities. Fortunately, these problems appear to occur only in a very few elections. N ever d oes the correlation coefficient between percent black and white educational level (or incom e level) exceed .5; and only in a few cases is it greater than .4. Equation 3 can produce estim ates for black and white turnout and partisan vote share based upon incom e levels. Just as with white educational level, we sorted these counties by white income levels based upon their standard deviations. They generally show the sam e pattern as for education.
O ne may question why white education and incom e levels are analyzed sepa rately. Indeed, a better indicator o f SES would be to com bine these into one SES variable, divided into high, medium, and low categories. While this is desirable, it is not practical. While white income and educational level tend to move together, there are frequent instances when n < 30 when following the dual requirement o f one standard deviation above and below the mean for the "high" and "low" categories.
